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Systems of Distribution and
a Sense of Equity: A Multilevel
Analysis of Meritocratic Attitudes
in Post-industrial Societies
Sheri Kunovich and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski
Meritocratic attitudes are defined as general beliefs that education and its correlates
should determine personal economic outcomes. Using the International Social Survey
Project (ISSP): Social Inequality Module (1992), we examine both individual-level and
country-level determinants of pro-meritocratic attitudes. According to self-interest and
rational-action theories, individuals with high educational attainment and high personal
income are expected to have strong meritocratic beliefs because meritocracy is in their best
interest—they would gain under such a system. At the same time, both modernization and
post-industrial theories imply that persons living in countries with a high degree of societal
meritocracy hold stronger meritocratic beliefs than persons living in countries with low
degree of societal meritocracy. Results of the Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) analysis
on a data set including 7,972 persons from 14 countries indicate that the impact of
individuals’ education and income on meritocratic attitudes occurred as theoretically
predicted. We also demonstrate that the relationship between the degree of societal
meritocracy and the degree of support for such a system is statistically significant even if
national wealth and educational stock (as well as individual-level variables) are controlled.
In addition, we discovered that at the beginning of the 1990s a post-communist regime
had a negative effect on support for meritocracy.
Introduction
Past research has identified various individual-level
determinants of attitudes towards social inequality
and the conditions under which injustice is perceived
(Jasso and Rossi, 1977; Alves and Rossi, 1978;
Jasso, 1978; Robinson and Bell, 1978; Jasso, 1980;
Wesolowski, 1981; Krauze and Slomczynski, 1985;
Shepelak and Alwin, 1986; Shepelak, 1989; Ritzman
and Tomaskovic-Devey, 1992). Moreover, comparative
researchers have identified a cross-national pattern
with respect to how individuals justify inequality
(Mateju and Rehakova, 1992; Mateju and Tucek,
1992; Kelley and Evans, 1993; Kluegel et al., 1995),
including meritocratic beliefs (Shepelak, 1989;
Mateju and Rehakova, 1992; Mateju and Tucek,
1992; Locklear, 1998; Slomczynski and Wesolowski,
2001). However, none of the published studies have
examined meritocratic attitudes in the context of
both individual-level and country-level determinants.
Do individuals with high educational attainment and
high personal income have strong meritocratic beliefs
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independent of the degree of actual meritocracy
achieved in the countries in which they live? Does
the degree of societal meritocracy, defined on the
country-level, affect people’s attitude toward meritoc-
racy independent of their education and income? Ours
is the first study to examine these theoretically relevant
issues by using the Hierarchical Linear Modeling
(HLM) framework.
In this article, we introduce new scales of merito-
cratic attitudes that can be used cross-nationally, and
examine conditions under which people legitimate
inequality on the basis of merit. We emphasize the
importance of contextual variables, in particular the
degree of actual meritocracy, for the formation of
attitudes regarding just (equitable) distribution. Using
the International Social Survey Project (ISSP): Social
Inequality Module that includes appropriate data on
7,972 individuals from 14 countries for 1992, we
test specific hypotheses about the impact of both
individual-level variables (education and income)
and country-level variables (societal meritocracy). The
article begins with a short discussion of theoretical
background and formulation of hypotheses. Then, we
proceed to our main contribution of methodological
and substantive matter. In particular, we present
a multilevel analysis of a complex set of independent
variables and demonstrate their net effects on pro-
meritocratic stances in an interpretable manner. At the
end of the article, we discuss some implications of
the individual- and country-level effects in the context




Meritocracy: Actual and Desired
The concept of meritocracy refers to a large-scale social
system in which a positive relationship exists between
‘merit’ and such commonly desired resources as
income, power, and prestige. In various theoretical
contexts, merit is measured in several ways including
cognitive skills or educational attainment and desired
resources (rewards) are inferred from occupation or
earnings. In this article, we refer to an ‘education-
income’ meritocracy since it is well-grounded in both
modernization and post-industrial theory.
Modernization and post-industrial theories postulate
that educational attainment will increasingly become
the mechanism through which people are selected
into jobs. In accordance with this theory, Daniel Bell
(1973, 1996) argues that theoretical knowledge forms
the ‘axial principle’ around which modern societies are
structured. In post-industrial societies, firms no longer
compete over material resources; rather they compete
for new technological and organizational solutions that
stem from innovation. Innovation in post-industrial
societies is induced to a great degree by the tertiary
educational experience. As a result of the inherent
rationality of a post-industrial society, firms seek the
most highly educated labourer they can attract given
the rewards at their disposal, earnings and possibly
benefits. Therefore, a post-industrial society is in its
logic a meritocracy where the highly educated are
the most rewarded (Halsey, 1967; Dahrendorf, 1968;
Bell, 1973; Husen, 1974; Krauze and Slomczynski,
1985).
Meritocracy is considered not only a rational
justification for inequality but also a just system of
distribution. The equity principle, understood as a
desirable rule of distribution (Cook, 1975; Deutsch,
1975; Bierhoff et al., 1986), postulates that the value
of inputs should equal, in its standardized form,
the value of outputs. When inputs are defined as
educational achievement and outputs are defined as
financial resources, the balancing of the two results in
a meritocratic allocation. Thus, meritocratic allocation
endorses a specific form of equity (Be´nabou, 2000).
Societies differ in the degree to which meritocratic
allocation is achieved (Krauze and Slomczynski, 1985;
Jonsson, 1989; Saunders, 1995; for a critical assessment
of the concept of meritocracy, see Goldthorpe 1996).
Do these differences affect the extent to which people
support meritocracy? Is there any covariation between
the degree of societal meritocracy and the strength of
meritocratic attitudes? To answer these questions,
we need to discuss meritocracy in its subjective
sense—that is as a popular belief according to which
the balance between merit and rewards should be
maintained.
To assess who favours a balance between education
and income, people should be directly asked about
various aspects of personal merit (such as education
and training, and responsibility) producing economic
gain (earnings in particular). However, other indirect
indicators may be used as well. Invoking the family
situation as a criterion for deciding pay on the job is
an example of an anti-meritocratic stance. Similarly,
those who support governmental policies that aim at
assuring full employment are more anti-meritocratic
than those who oppose such policies. As in all survey
research seeking to measure attitudes towards distrib-
utive justice, respondents must be confronted with
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questions containing a normative component: what
should be rather than what is.
A Model and Hypotheses
Figure 1 presents the relationship between both
individual and contextual independent variables and
how they affect attitudes towards the distribution of
income on the basis of merit. The causal model
identifies the direct effects of education, income,
societal degree of meritocracy, educational stock,
national wealth, and a type of political regime.
It also takes into account individual control
variables—sex and age. We will explain the meaning
and theoretical importance of these variables.
Individual determinants of economic justice are
usually interpretable in terms of expected gains and
losses (Homans, 1967; Swift and Marshall, 1997).
Within the framework of both self-interest theory and
rational action theories, one would expect that persons
with high levels of education endorse a system where
rewards are determined by merit, in particular
education and its correlates, because they will gain
from this system. Persons with lower education
will oppose pro-meritocratic policies in determining
income because under such policies they are likely
to lose.
In agreement with this line of theorizing, past
research has shown that persons of higher levels of
income tend to support inequality more than persons
with lower levels of income (Robinson and Bell, 1978;
Ritzman and Tomaskovic-Devey, 1992). Those who are
currently benefiting from the system are more likely
to prefer a system in which income inequalities
are not restricted and do not depend on needs.
Those with low incomes would be opposed to merit
determining pay because merit-based criteria usually
lead to greater inequality and ignore differing individ-
ual needs.
In a general form, our first hypothesis refers to the
crucial individual level variables and states that
education and income have a positive impact on
pro-meritocratic attitudes. In particular, we expect
that (i) within each country there is a positive and
statistically significant correlation between education
and income and support for merit-based pay. We also
expect that (ii) within each country after controlling
for age and sex both independent variables—education
and income—have a positive and statistically signifi-
cant net effect on pro-meritocratic attitudes. Finally,
we expect that (iii) education and income explain a
significant proportion of variation in pro-meritocratic
attitudes across countries.
The second type of hypotheses pertains to country-
level variables: the degree of actual meritocracy and its
main correlates, including national wealth and educa-
tional stock. We expect the most important contextual
predictor of meritocratic attitudes to be the degree
to which there is an association between merit
and reward at the societal level. The degree of actual
meritocracy affects attitudes toward such a system
because individuals realize that earned economic
rewards are determined by merit. In particular, indi-
viduals view merit as a legitimate basis upon which to
establish pay, as a result of living in a post-industrial
society where knowledge is necessary for economic
advancement.
The actual degree of meritocracy is influenced,
with some time-lag, by the educational and financial
resources of a society. However, both educational stock
and national wealth can exercise an independent effect
on beliefs about meritocracy. We expect that the
greater the proportion of highly educated individuals
in a society, the greater the tendency that merit is
viewed as a legitimate way to reward individuals.
National wealth, in addition to affecting the degree of
meritocracy and the educational stock, also influences
individual attitudes towards meritocracy—as suggested
by modernization theory. Wealthier societies are
characterized by inequality that, if based on achieve-
ment, is popularly perceived as legitimate (So, 1990).
Therefore, we can expect that persons living in
wealthier societies will believe that merit determines
economic success and the merit should determine
future pay.
Although it is important to control for the effects of
the experience with a welfare state on attitudes
(Kluegel and Miyano, 1995; Gelissen, 2000; Andreb
and Heien, 2001; Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Svallfors,
2003), we focus on the fact that living in any type of
traditional capitalist society pre-disposes a person to
















Figure 1 Theoretical model
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a society where equal benefits are given to all is
conducive to a belief that merit plays less of a natural
role in determining outcomes. Thus, people living in
post-communist societies should oppose meritocracy
given their experiences under a socialist economic
system. To examine this effect, one should take into
account the period of the early phase of the post-
communist transformation—the phase of radical social
change. Summarizing, our country-level hypotheses
predicts that (i) the degree of meritocracy, educational
stock, and national wealth has a positive effect on
support for meritocracy; in contrast, (ii) a post-
communist regime has a negative effect on support
for meritocracy.
In the case of country-level characteristics included
in our model, the direction of causality needs some
explanation, particularly pertaining to the impact of
societal meritocracy on pro-meritocratic attitudes.
Is the reverse causal relationship plausible? Are
countries with people having stronger pro-meritocratic
attitudes likely to establish a meritocratic distribution
of income? Our answer to this type of question is
negative, since in the theoretical framework adapted
in this article meritocratic rules operating on the
labour market are introduced due to economic factors.
Those who set up these rules are motivated by
expected productivity and profits—not by the public
opinion. In other words, the public opinion can adjust
to these rules but it is not a force that shapes them.
Analogically, we extend this reasoning about the causal
priority of country-level variables—educational stock,
national wealth, and post-communist regime—over
individual level variables. We time-order our variables
included in model in accordance with this reasoning,
thus avoiding confusion regarding what causes what.
We should also note that theoretically educational
and income inequality could also influence societal
meritocracy and pro-meritocratic attitudes. However,
since the degree of meritocracy analytically implies
a certain degree of inequality, we have good reason to
omit the latter. By definition, meritocracy captures
inequality to a considerable extent (Be´nabou, 2000).
Data and Measurement
International Social Survey Project (ISSP): Social
Inequality Module, administered in 1992, is the result
of the collaborative efforts of researchers in Europe,
North America, Australia and New Zealand. We
restricted our analysis to countries listed in the
Appendix. Their population varies from 3.4 million
in New Zealand to 252.2 million in the United States.
Although all of these countries are industrialized, they
differ greatly with respect to levels of economic
development and investment in education. Moreover,
some have been classified as traditional or welfare
capitalist systems while others belong to the post-
communist block. We focus on the core of the labour
force defined as people 21–65 years old classified as
full-time employees, constituting from 31.1 to 51.7per
cent of the original national samples.2 In the Appendix,
we note specific features of the samples, data collec-
tion, and data quality. Although our analyses have not
revealed that these methodological cross-national
differences have any effect on substantive results
presented in this article, the reader oriented toward
case studies should be aware of them since they may
be pertinent for interpretation of national-specific
findings.
Measurement of Meritocratic Attitudes
We use six questionnaire items to construct the index
of support for a meritocratic distribution of income.
The first five items refer to the block of questions
in which the respondent was asked to state how
important the following factors should be in determin-
ing pay (1) the number of years spent in education and
training, (2) the amount of responsibility that goes with
the job, (3) how well the person does the job, (4) what is
needed to support a family, and (5) whether the
person has children to support. In all of these
questions, a five-point scale ranging from essential to
not important at all was used. Applying face-validity
criterion, we assume that for items (1), (2), and
(3) the response essential and for items (4) and
(5) the response not important (either not important at
all or not very important) indicates a pro-meritocratic
stance. In addition, we assume that agreeing with the
statement (6) the government should provide jobs for
everyone who wants one indicates an anti-meritocratic
stance, since the policy implied by this statement
disregards any merit-based consideration in allocating
people to jobs. Given that full employment induced
by a non-market mechanism would be detrimental for
a meritocratic income distribution, we assume that
meritocrats oppose the governmental policies that aim
at assuring full employment. Generally, we agree with
Sen (2000: 14) that ‘the rewarding of merit and the
very concept of merit itself depend on the way we see
a good society and the criteria we invoke to assess the
successes and failures of societies.’
In Table 1, we provide questionnaire items used in
our scale of support for meritocratic distribution of
income. The first item—pertaining to education and
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training—requires some explanation. In exploratory
analysis of potential items for constructing the scale,
we discovered that the proportion of respondents
claiming that education and training should be essential
in deciding pay is very high and clusters with two
other criteria: hard work and supervising. Since in our
conceptualization of meritocracy, education and train-
ing plays an especially important role, we decided to
isolate this criterion from its correlates. We achieved
this goal by (i) regressing the full scale of responses
regarding education and training on analogous scales
regarding hard work and supervising, (ii) taking
residuals as a new variable for which unnecessary
influences have been partialed out, and (iii) adjusting
the essential category of answers to a situation in which
education and training was evaluated much higher
than expected on the basis of answers regarding hard
work and supervising. Thus, in Table 1, a percentage
for the essential category of answers for education and
training is somewhat arbitrary. However, percentages
for all other items—responsibility, how well the person
does the job, family, children, and jobs for everyone—
reflect unadjusted distributions.
Depending on the specific item, the percentage of
the total sample expressing a pro-meritocratic response
varies from one fifth to over one-third. The items
receiving the fewest pro-meritocratic responses are
those that express opposition to governmental policies
that would provide jobs for everyone who wants one
and opposition to taking into account what is needed
to support a family in deciding future pay. The items
receiving the most pro-meritocratic responses express
support for taking into account criteria such as how
well the persons does the job or education and training
in deciding future pay.
In the exploratory phase of index construction, we
carefully examined relationships between items and
considered utilizing factor analysis. However, the
average correlation among items proved to be weak
and all items share no more than 30 per cent of
variance. In this situation, we decided to rely on
a summative index. In choosing this strategy of index
Table 1 Questionnaire items and pro-meritocratic responses for the summative scale
Questionnaire item Total sample
Average score SD Item correlation
with the scale
x p !
Residual variable 0.31 0.46 0.366
How important do you think that should be in
deciding pay: the number of years spent in
education and training?
First, the amount of responsibility that goes with
the job - how important do you think that




How important should that be in deciding pay:




How important should that be in deciding pay:
what is needed to support a family?
0.22 0.42 0.595
Pro-meritocratic response:
Not important at all and not very important
How important should that be in deciding pay:
whether the person has children to support?
0.30 0.46 0.602
Pro-meritocratic response:
Not important at all and not very important
The government should provide jobs for every-
one who wants one.
0.21 0.41 0.464
Pro-meritocratic response:
Strongly disagree and disagree
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construction, we argue that support for meritocracy
is not a latent variable ‘causing’ particular responses to
the questionnaire items. Rather it is a stance, which
might be viewed as an aggregate of various opinions
about the relationship between merit and rewards.
There is no a priori reason why pro-meritocratic
opinion in one respect should be linked to pro-
meritocratic opinion in different respect. Since all
of our items meet face value criterion of measuring
pro-meritocratic stance, we use them regardless of how
they are correlated with each other. Thus, we opt for
summation scale rather than that based on factor
analysis.3 The values of the final index range from
0 to 6, with the mean 1.65, and SD 1.32.
In Table 1, we provide correlations of the index
with each item. Overall, correlations are moderate
(0.366 to 0.602) but meet conventional standards of
index construction. In substantive terms, the index is
loaded with items pertaining to anti-need-orientation.
In particular, the index correlates highly (r40.5) with
two items that evaluate whether supporting a family
and whether having children should not be important
in deciding future pay. Since meritocratism is anti-
thetical to the need-orientation, we accept this feature
of the index.
Measurement of Individual Independent
Variables
The two main determinants of support for meritoc-
racy, respondent’s education and income, are mea-
sured in a conventional way. Education is expressed in
terms of school-years. We standardized the income
distribution for each country to avoid difficulties with
transforming different currencies into a common
metric. Thus, individual incomes should be interpreted
as an inter-country positional measure.
We also include age and gender. Younger people are
better educated and they should support meritocracy
to the greater degree than older people. However, the
reverse relationship might be expected if someone
takes into account that having longer experience on
the labour market ‘teaches’ employees that meritocracy
is a more productive system than that based on needs.
Because of these competing expectations, we treat
age only as control variable. It is expressed in term
of years.
According to our hypothesis, women should support
a meritocratic distribution of income more than men.
While women’s income correlates with education on
a similar level as in the case of men, the labour market
moving toward meritocracy would bring greater gains
to women in comparison to men. Rationally, it is in
the interest of women to support meritocracy.
To reflect the posited relation by positive slope,
women are coded 1 and men 0.
Societal Degree of Meritocracy and
Other Characteristics of Countries
The meritocratic principle, as understood in this
article, requires that more educated persons should
not have lower incomes than less educated ones.
Equivalently, persons at a given level of education
should have an income equal to or higher than the
income of persons at a lower level of education. Given
a univariate distribution of education and a univariate
distribution of income, the meritocratic principle,
stated formally, determines the joint distribution of
the two. This bivariate distribution, called meritocratic
allocation, is obtained according to an algorithm
(Krauze and Slomczynski, 1985) that is an operation-
alization of Thurow (1975) idea of queuing as a job
allocation mechanism (for an application, see Wang
2002). The basic features of this allocation have been
known since the work of Anderson (1961) (see also
Boudon, 1974; Hope, 1984) and utilized in the context
of simulation analysis of the relationship between
education and social mobility. For a given population
assigned to given levels of education and income,
the meritocratic allocation can be found as a solution
of a linear programming that optimizes the relation-
ship between education and income. According to
such solution, the correlation between these two
variable reaches its maximum under the distributional
constrains.
Table 2 provides an example of both observed and
meritocratic allocation (panels A and B). Computing
values of the index of dissimilarity between these
allocations (panel C), we determine the percentage of
persons who should be moved to achieve the ideal
meritocracy. Since this percentage (D) can be inter-
preted as a distance from meritocracy, its difference
from 100 is a measure to what extent a country is
meritocratic, M¼ 100D. Thus, the higher the value
of M, the more meritocratic is the country.
In Table 3, we provide the values of M for all
countries. According to this measure the most
meritocratic countries are East Germany, the United
States, Czechoslovakia, Australia, Bulgaria, and
Norway. Russia, Poland and West Germany are the
least meritocratic. The discrepancy between location
of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria on
one hand, and Russia and Poland, on the other,
shows different paths of the development of countries
from the former Soviet block. In the 1950s and 1960s
654 KUNOVICH AND SLOMCZYNSKI
 at Southern M
ethodist U






all these countries were similar with respect to the
association between education and income, since the
same rules of allocating money on the labour market
were uniformly controlled by the communist party.
The method of assigning earnings to qualifications,
called ‘tarification’, was strictly applied, with two
notable exceptions: communist party positions and
heavy industry. The labour market imbalances accom-
panying the erosion and dismay of the communist
system differed country by country.
The discrepancy between the location of the United
States and West Germany demonstrates the internal
differentiation among traditional capitalist countries.
To be sure that such patterns are not artificial products
of the method we used, we compared our M-scale
with that obtained according to the simplest measure
of meritocracy, that is the bivariate correlation
between education and earnings. Overall, the ranking
of countries according to both these measures coincide
to a great extent. However, our measure is preferable
since it reflects the necessary mobility to achieve an
ideal state of meritocracy.
Since in our theoretical model we include two
determinants of the degree of societal meritocracy—
educational stock and national wealth—in Table 3 we
provide values of these variables for all 14 countries.
Both these variables do not share more than 50 per
cent of common variance; their correlation with
meritocracy is modest (0.25r50.3).
Results
Within-Country Patterns
Within each country, there is a tendency that the
higher the level of education the stronger is the level
of support for a meritocratic distribution of income.
However, the strength of this tendency, expressed in
terms of a correlation between an individual’s years of
education and their meritocratic beliefs, varies among
countries: it is strongest in Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and Hungary (r40.250) and lowest in East and West
Germany, Italy, New Zealand, and Russia (r50.125).
In all countries included in our analysis this correla-
tion is statistically significant (P50.01).
With the exception of East Germany, the correlation
of individual earnings and support for meritocracy is
also positive and statistically significant. The strongest
correlation occurs in Great Britain (r¼ 0.305) followed
by New Zealand, Canada, and West Germany
(r40.230). In the remaining cases, this correlation
varies between 0.100 and 0.200. Thus, there is a ten-
dency whereby people with higher levels of earnings






2 3 4 5
(Low)
A. Observed Allocation (%)
1 (High) 5.1 3.1 1.4 1.6 1.0 12.2
2 4.7 4.5 3.7 3.4 2.7 18.9
3 2.5 2.9 2.9 3.3 2.7 14.2
4 5.6 6.9 7.6 7.2 9.0 36.3
5 (Low) 1.9 2.9 4.5 4.8 4.3 18.4
19.8 20.2 20.1 20.2 19.7
B. Meritocratic allocation (%)
1 (High) 12.2 12.2
2 7.6 11.3 18.9
3 8.9 5.3 14.2
4 14.8 20.2 1.3 36.3
5 (Low) 18.4 18.4
19.8 20.2 20.1 20.2 19.7 100.0
C. Difference (AB)
1 (High) 7.1 3.1 1.4 1.6 1.0
2 2.9 6.8 3.7 3.4 2.7
3 2.5 6.0 2.4 3.3 2.7
4 5.6 6.9 7.2 13.0 7.7
5 (Low) 1.9 2.9 4.5 4.8 14.1
D¼ 59.6% M¼ 100D¼ 40.4%









Australia 54.26 29 13.27
Bulgaria 51.90 23 2.92
Canada 49.10 58 16.76
Czechoslovakia 57.17 16 3.35
East Germany 62.16 30 7.47
Great Britain 47.20 22 12.79
Hungary 47.87 15 3.50
Italy 48.45 24 13.42
New Zealand 48.98 36 10.19
Norway 51.84 35 19.13
Poland 44.00 18 3.20
Russia 35.10 23 5.12
United States 60.72 60 19.70
West Germany 44.42 32 14.37
aMeasured as the percent of the population in tertiary education
(World Bank, 1997).
bMeasured as GNP per capita (World Bank, 1997).
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support a meritocratic distribution of income more
than people with lower levels of earnings.
With notable exceptions, these two tendencies
are also clear in the regression framework (Table 4).
In the equation explaining support for a meritocratic
distribution of income slopes for education and
earnings are positive and significant in 10 of the
14 countries. The notable exceptions are Italy and
New Zealand in the case of education, and East
Germany and Hungary in the case of earnings. In these
countries the net pro-meritocratic impact of either
education or earnings is essentially washed out since,
as we already mentioned, the respective bivariate
correlations were low. It is important to note that
education was coded in a crude manner in both
Italy and New Zealand and a large standard error
for the regression coefficient might be a purely
methodological effect. However, the weak impact of
earnings in East Germany and Hungary is likely to
be of a substantive nature. In these countries, the
economic turmoil associated with the initial phase of
the post-communist transition resulted in dramatic
fluctuations in earnings making it difficult for earnings
to exercise any observable impact on equity beliefs.
Generally, the effects of education and income are
linear and additive. We did not detect any interaction
effects of these variables on the level of countries.
In other words, status inconsistency involving educa-
tion and income does not affect pro-meritocratic
attitudes above and beyond the impact of these two
variables.
There is no significant effect for age in more than
half of the countries. In those countries where the
effect is significant, age has a negative effect in Norway
Table 4 Regression of support for meritocracy on age, sex, education, income for 14 countries, 1992
Country Age Sex Education Income Constant Adjusted
R-squared
b b b b b b b b
Australia 0.000 0.002 0.120 0.038 0.075 0.153 0.196 0.144 1.023 0.054
(0.004) (0.104) (0.017) (0.047) (0.301)
Great Britain 0.004 0.038 0.186 0.068 0.123 0.145 0.312 0.244 0.464 0.118
(0.004) (0.090) (0.031) (0.046) (0.443)
Bulgaria 0.010 0.072 0.162 0.067 0.049 0.111 0.166 0.139 0.814 0.042
(0.004) (0.082) (0.015) (0.041) (0.262)
Canada 0.010 0.022 0.132 0.047 0.060 0.096 0.354 0.254 1.343 0.077
(0.005) (0.094) (0.022) (0.055) (0.374)
Czechoslovakia 0.002 0.015 0.162 0.059 0.145 0.301 0.098 0.072 0.156 0.116
(0.004) (0.091) (0.016) (0.047) (0.274)
East Germany 0.001 0.012 0.226 0.099 0.036 0.095 0.026 0.023 0.864 0.019
(0.004) (0.076) (0.013) (0.039) (0.212)
Hungary 0.011 0.087 0.064 0.025 0.107 0.239 0.071 0.057 0.198 0.074
(0.004) (0.084) (0.016) (0.046) (0.273)
Italy 0.015 0.141 0.154 0.063 0.011 0.039 0.129 0.117 1.758 0.043
(0.004) (0.081) (0.010) (0.038) (0.218)
New Zealand 0.005 0.039 0.138 0.045 0.016 0.038 0.364 0.256 2.054 0.068
(0.004) (0.101) (0.014) (0.050) (0.268)
Norway 0.013 0.118 0.212 0.084 0.060 0.155 0.226 0.183 1.077 0.087
(0.004) (0.089) (0.014) (0.047) (0.260)
Poland 0.023 0.160 0.094 0.033 0.185 0.346 0.175 0.128 1.129 0.156
(0.004) (0.091) (0.017) (0.044) (0.284)
Russia 0.001 0.007 0.167 0.091 0.033 0.113 0.060 0.067 0.736 0.029
(0.003) (0.061) (0.010) (0.030) (0.187)
United States 0.005 0.035 0.385 0.131 0.108 0.193 0.177 0.123 0.329 0.074
(0.005) (0.100) (0.019) (0.054) (0.346)
West Germany 0.002 0.021 0.165 0.062 0.022 0.059 0.282 0.234 0.970 0.064
(0.004) (0.091) (0.013) (0.045) (0.234)
P40.05, P40.10
Standard errors in parentheses.
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and Italy, while it has a positive effect in Canada,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland. Given the fact that
both Italy and Norway are classic welfare states while
the other four countries in 1992 were adopting more
pro-market policies these findings confirm the fact
that age impacts attitudes in different ways, depending
on other macro-conditions.
With respect to our expectation that women would
be more pro-meritocratic than men, our findings
are somewhat mixed. To begin with in nine of the
14 countries we find significant differences between
women and men’s levels of support for a meritocratic
distribution of income. In four of these countries,
Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Russia women
are less supportive of a meritocratic distribution than
men, while in the remaining five countries, Bulgaria,
East Germany, Norway, the United States, and West
Germany women are more supportive than men.
The fact that women are more supportive of the
market policies then men corresponds to our theoret-
ical expectation and other findings (Zago´rski, 1998).
All together, depending on a country, four
variables—sex, age, education, and earnings—explain
from 2 per cent to 16 per cent of variance of our index
of the support for meritocracy. This is in agreement
with typical studies of the impact of the basic
demographic and stratification variables on attitudes.
Across Country Patterns
In Figure 2, we present the overall relationship between
the degree of societal meritocracy (measured by our
index M) and the average level of national support for
a meritocratic distribution of income. Great Britain,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
are relatively meritocratic countries not only in terms
of actual relationship between education and income
but also in terms of the popular support for
meritocracy. All of these countries are well-established
capitalist democracies where national sentiment in the
early 1990s went into the direction of pro-market
and anti-welfare state solutions. At that time, other
well-established capitalist democracies—Italy, Norway,
and West Germany—were slightly less meritocratic in
both objective and subjective dimensions. In these
countries, elites and the public supported significant
welfare state provisions to cope with internal
economic difficulties. The core of East and East-
Central European countries—East Germany, Hungary,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria—lies between
these two groups. Russia is an exception with the
lowest degree of actual meritocracy and the lowest
degree of popular support for a meritocratic distribu-
tion of income.
Final Models
Given the hierarchical structure of our data, individ-
uals nested within countries, ordinarily least
squares (OLS) regression would be inappropriate to
determine the effects of individual and contextual-
level variables across countries. Hierarchical data
structures have been shown to violate basic assump-
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Figure 2 Relationship between degree of meritocracy and average value of support for meritocracy
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case-dependency and heteroskedasticity. Therefore, we
present results in Tables 5 and 6 using HLM to avoid
some obvious shortcomings of OLS regression applied
to contextual variables.
We first determine if support for a meritocratic
distribution of income varies among countries. Using
a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) model with
random effects—also known as a fully conditional
model—we are able to determine what proportion of
the variance of support for meritocratic pay is
attributable to between and within country compo-
nents. In other words, what percent of variance in
support for meritocratic pay can be attributed to
country and individual-level variables?
Results suggest that 6 per cent of the variance in
support for a meritocratic distribution of income is
attributable to country-level differences. The between-
country variances (Tau) in support for a meritocratic
distribution of income is 0.063. With a chi-square
statistics of 610.8 and 13 degrees of freedom, the
between-country variance in meritocratic attitudes
is significant at the 0.001 level. Therefore, results
from the fully unconditional model suggest that
a significant amount of the variance in support for a
meritocratic distribution of incomes exists between
countries.
In Table 5, we estimate a random coefficient
regression model in which only individual level predic-
tors are included to determine if individual character-
istics such as, education, income, sex, and age affect
support for a meritocratic distribution of income.
Results from the random coefficient regression model
suggest that education and income are both significant
positive predictors of support for a meritocratic distri-
bution of income. A one-unit increase in education
increases support for a meritocratic distribution of
income by 0.148. While age does not have a significant
effect, women are significantly more likely to support
a meritocratic distribution of income than men.
The individual-level variables explain 5.21 per cent of
the within-country variance and 16.07 per cent of the
between- country variance in support for a merito-
cratic distribution of income.4 Therefore, a significant
amount of the between-country variation in support
for a meritocratic distribution of income remains to
be explained.
In Table 6, we estimate two intercepts as outcomes
models to determine if societal meritocracy, educa-
tional stock, national wealth, and previous experience
under a communist regime explain differences in
support for a meritocratic distribution of income.
This type of hierarchical linear model examines
Table 5 Support for meritocracy: an HLM within country model




Intercept 0.0096 0.0623 0.154
Age 0.0057 0.0109 0.523
Female 0.0584 0.0227 2.573
Education 0.1481 0.0118 12.564














Intercept 0.0528 13 573.61 0.000
Level-1 0.8131
P50.05 (two-tailed)
aAll level-1 predictors have been centered around their grand means. The residual parameter variance for all level-1 predictors has been set to
zero.
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cross-level interactions between the country-level pre-
dictors and the support for a meritocratic distribution
of income intercept. Results from the intercepts as
outcomes models provide support for most of our
hypotheses.
As predicted an increase in the degree of societal
meritocracy increases support for a meritocratic
distribution of income (see Table 6, Model 1).
A one-unit positive change in the degree of societal
meritocracy increases support for a meritocratic
distribution of income by 0.1271. In addition,
the educational stock of a nation, measured as the
percent of persons in tertiary education, also increases
support for a meritocratic distribution of income.
Unexpectedly, increases in national wealth, measured
as GNP/capita, actually decrease support for a merito-
cratic distribution of income. Finally, prior experience
under a communist regime decreases support for
a meritocratic distribution of income as expected.
The individual and country-level variables in Model 1
account for 60 per cent of the between-country
variance.
In Model 2, we present a second set of results to
determine what proportion of the between-country
variance can be attributed to the degree of societal
meritocracy. Results show that 23.5 per cent of the
between-country explained variance can be attributed
to the degree of societal meritocracy. These results
provide support for our major hypothesis linking
systems of distribution with a sense of equity.
In particular, the degree of societal meritocracy does
in fact significantly affect support for a meritocratic
rule, net of an individual’s position in the social
structure and additional characteristics about the
societies they are living in.
Discussion and Conclusion
Previous research on the determinants of attitudes
towards social inequality, in particular meritocratic
attitudes, has not included both individual and
country-level determinants, and their interaction.
Researchers have focused primarily on differences in
within-country patterns of support for a merit-based






SE t-statistic SE t-statistic
Intercept 0.2920 0.1067 2.736 0.2283 0.1285 1.777
Country-level variables
Degree of meritocracy 0.1271 0.0504 2.521
National wealth 0.4586 0.1434 3.197 0.3837 0.1739 2.207
Educational stock 0.1856 0.0771 2.408 0.2147 0.0944 2.274
Post-communist country 0.6590 0.2265 2.909 0.5105 0.2710 1.884
Individual-level variables
Age 0.0056 0.0109 0.516 0.0057 0.0109 0.523
Female 0.0588 0.0227 2.587 0.0586 0.0227 2.578
Education 0.1473 0.0118 12.495 0.1474 0.0118 12.496

















aAll level-1 predictors have been centered around their grand means. The residual parameter variance for all level-1 predictors has been set to
zero. All level-2 predictors have been centered around their grand means.
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distribution, speculating only on cross-national differ-
ences. In contrast, our study is the first to examine
under what societal level conditions an individual
will legitimate inequalities in future pay on the basis of
merit. Analyses presented in this article establish
several important findings.
First, previous researchers have used a latent
construct to measure meritocratic attitudes in single-
nation or comparative studies of fewer than four
countries (Mateju and Rehakova, 1992; Mateju and
Tucek, 1992; Shepelak, 1989). As a result, they were
not particularly concerned with establishing within-
and between-country equivalence of their dependent
variable. Identifying a valid measure of support for
meritocracy that is reliable across countries is a critical
component of a comparative analysis. We concluded
that a latent construct is not a valid measure for a
larger set of countries. Rather, a summed index is
more appropriate. In choosing this strategy of index
construction, we argue that support for meritocracy is
not a latent variable ‘causing’ particular responses to
the questionnaire items. It is a stance, which might be
viewed as an aggregate of various opinions about the
relationship between merit and rewards. We recom-
mend this scale for future research on attitudes toward
meritocracy.
Second, in this analysis, we explain a relatively
large proportion of the between-country variation in
support for a meritocratic distribution of income.
We show that significant differences in mean levels of
support for a meritocratic distribution of income are
the result of societal characteristics, in particular the
degree to which a meritocratic assignment of individ-
uals has occurred. The concept of meritocracy refers to
both a social system, where the relationship between
merit and desired rewards is particularly strong and
also to a subjective evaluation of a legitimate basis of
inequality. This analysis clearly shows that after
controlling for an individual’s position in the social
structure, the degree to which their country has
achieved a meritocratic distribution positively affects
their support for a merit-based distribution.
Third, it is well known that acceptable levels of
economic inequality vary from country to country
(Kelley and Evans, 1993). In addition, single nation
studies and comparative studies have determined that
what is considered a legitimate basis for inequality
varies as well (Kluegel et al., 1995; Locklear, 1998).
Based on within-country regressions, we have shown
that the relative importance of individual level
characteristics varies. For instance, in Poland education
is the most important determinant of support for
meritocracy, while income is the most important
determinant in New Zealand (Table 4). Although
specific inter-country differences need to be accounted
for in future research, generally our analyses
support all hypotheses pertaining to the effects of
individual level variables on a sense of equity. What
previous research has not established though is
the independent effect that both individual and
country-level factors have on support for meritocracy.
Our study is the first to show that the degree to which
a country has adopted a meritocratic distribution of
income positively affects support for such a system,
controlling for an individual’s position in the social
structure.
The study of distributive justice attitudes continues
to be important in both well-established democracies
and newly emerging democracies. In well-established
democracies individual attitudes towards systems of
distribution influence the degree to which the state
will be involved in the redistribution of resources
(Esping-Anderson, 1990). In addition, scholars study-
ing the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe,
consistently warned that if the emerging economic
inequalities were not viewed as legitimate it would
threaten the pace of economic and political reforms
(Przeworski, 1991). We extend this argument claiming
that a sense of equity is an important variable in
a general support for radical social change. Ideological
legacy proved to be an obstacle in forming pro-
meritocratic attitudes since at the early stage of
transformation post-communist societies were less
meritocratic than other industrialized countries, even
if the level of actual meritocracy was controlled. It is
interesting that in all these post-communist countries
in which elites stressed pro-meritocratic basis for
distribution of income—Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, and Slovakia—some observable advances in
economic development were achieved. These advances
were accompanied by the increase in pro-meritocratic
attitudes as indicated by other studies. In particular,
referring to the late 1990s, Redmond et al. (2002: 21)
found ‘no substantial east–west differences in the
level of support for ‘‘objective’’ criteria in terms of
earning determinants. People in both east and west
appear to share basically the same views as to how
earnings should be determined’. Thus, we were able to
detect a cross-national difference that used to be
important at the initial phase of the post-communist
transformation, separating the path of development of
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia
from that of Russia. Actual meritocracy and pro-
meritocratic attitudes became important factors for
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understanding divergent paths of development of
post-communist societies.
Notes
1. Following suggestions of our critics, we differenti-
ate between capitalist societies, and distinguish
between liberal, conservative, and social democratic
welfare states. However, because of data limitation
(small N representing each type of welfare state),
we decided not to peruse this line of inquiry
about inter-country differences hypothesized and
documented in recent years (Gelissen, 2000;
Andreß and Heien, 2001; Arts and Gelissen,
2001). For meritocratic attitudes, the distinction
between post-communist states and traditional
capitalist states is much more important than any
division within capitalist welfare states.
2. We restrict our sample to full-time employees
since in this case job income is relatively inter--
person comparable in terms of its utility. This is
not the case of part time employment due to great
variation in employers’ contributions to health and
pension plans as well as other contract arrange-
ments and work conditions. Thus, our estimates
of the model parameters are meant for a specific
reference population and should not be over-
generalized. In particular, the sex-specific selection
to full-time employment, disallow our estimates
for gender to be treated as valid for all working
men and women.
3. In confirmatory factor analysis, lambda coefficients
vary only from 0.4 to 0.6. In consequence, the
weights for all items lead to the comparable
solution to that presented in this article; the
correlation between the confirmatory factor solu-
tion and our index is above 0.9. However, we
decided to rely on summation scale, with all
weights equal 1, on substantive grounds: Each
item contributes to the concept of meritocracy on
its own rights, not because of its relations with
other items, like in factor analysis.
4. Since we standardized income within countries,
income does not contribute to the between-
country variance.
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Appendix General description of data from International Social Survey Program: Social Inequality Module,
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Australia 2203 906 72% Self-completed 2 3 2
Bulgaria 1198 403 80% Interviewed 3 1 3
Canada 1043 410 74% Self-completed 1 3 3
Czechoslovakia 1101 569 78% Not available 1 3 2
East Germany 1094 407 50% Self-completed 2 3 1
Great Britain 1034 357 56% Self-completed 3 2 3
Hungary 1235 521 83% Interviewed 2 1 3
Italy 1000 350 (NA) Interviewed 1 2 1
New Zealand 1239 513 68% Self-completed 1 2 2
Norway 1538 686 64% Self-completed 2 2 2
Poland 1636 668 85% Self-completed 3 1 1
Russia 1944 922 92% Self-completed 3 1 3
United States 1273 546 84% Self-completed 1 1 1
West Germany 2297 714 50% Self-completed 3 3 1
Note: Distribution statistics of all variables discussed in this article, as well as all additional analyses, are available from the authors.
aAustria, Slovinia, and Sweden are omitted since the national questionnaires in in these countries did not include some relevant items. Since our
analysis is restricted to the industrialized world, we also omitted the Philippines.
bWe apply two weighting procedures. The first procedure is included in the ISSP Social Inequality Module to correct for major country-specific
sample bias. The second procedure, eliminating the effect of different sizes of national samples, employs weights that equalize the sample size so
countries with small samples are scaled up. After employing both weighting procedures the overall size of the sample is 12,739.
cThis value is constructed on the basis of 10 randomly selected items, which were asked in all 14 countries. Countries with a 1 have the lowest
average number of missing cases on the 10 items while countries with a 3 had the highest average number of missing cases.
dThe values in Column 1 are constructed on the basis of four basic individual characteristics: age, sex, education, and income. Countries with
a 1 have the lowest average number of missing cases on the 4 items while countries with a 3 have the highest average. The values in Column 2 are
constructed on the basis of 2 sets of items. First, marital status and employment status of one’s spouse and number of hours worked and
employment status. Countries with a 1 have the lowest average number of inconsistent answers, while countries with a 3 have the highest average
number of inconsistent answers. For all countries the percent of cases with inconsistent answers is quite small.
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